[150] On 31 December 1968, the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion was landed west of Khe Sanh to commence Operation Dawson River West, on 2 January 1969 the 9th Marines and 2nd ARVN Regiment were also deployed on the plateau supported by the newly established Fire Support Bases Geiger and Smith; the 3-week operation found no significant PAVN forces or supplies in the Khe Sanh area. The PAVN, however, were not through with the ARVN troops. Besieged, Khe Sanh could only be resupplied by air. [42], In the wake of the hill fights, a lull in PAVN activity occurred around Khe Sanh. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, as many as 30,000 Communist Vietnamese forces surrounded roughly 6,000 U.S. marines defending a combat base on .. Week of February 21 The monumental Battle of Khe Sanh had begun, but the January 21 starting date is essentially arbitrary in terms of casualty reporting. The opportunity to engage and destroy a formerly elusive enemy that was moving toward a fixed position promised a victory of unprecedented proportions. [98] The Marines continued to oppose the operation until Westmoreland actually had to issue an order to Cushman to allow the rescue operation to proceed. It was later renamed "Dye Marker" by MACV in September 1967, just as the PAVN began the first phase of their offensive by launching attacks against Marine-held positions across the DMZ. Seven miles west of Khe Sanh on Route 9, and about halfway to the Laotian border, sat the U.S. Army Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. For them, the battle started when the North Vietnamese attacks began in January. Westmoreland echoed this judgment in his memoirs, and, using exactly the same figures, concluded that the North Vietnamese had suffered a most damaging and one-sided defeat. Two days later, the PAVN 273rd Regiment attacked a Special Forces camp near the border town of Loc Ninh, in Bnh Long Province. "[149], While KSCB was abandoned, the Marines continued to patrol the Khe Sanh plateau, including reoccupying the area with ARVN forces from 519 October 1968 with minimal opposition. That did not mean, however, that battle was over. [32], Westmoreland responded by launching Operation Neutralize, an aerial and naval bombardment campaign designed to break the siege. Later, the 1/1 Marines and 3rd ARVN Airborne Task Force (the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Airborne Battalions) would join the operation. American intelligence estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 PAVN troops were killed during the operation, equating to up to 90% of the attacking 17,200-man PAVN force. The 1968 Battle of Khe Sanh was the longest, deadliest and most controversial of the Vietnam War, pitting the U.S. Marines and their allies against the North Vietnamese Army. Five Marines were killed on January 19 and 20, while on reconnaissance patrols. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. Battle of Khe Sanh The attack finally came on January 21, 1968, when PAVN forces began a massive artillery bombardment of Khe Sanh, hitting the base's main store of ammunition and destroying. And it had accomplished its purpose magnificently. [80] Westmoreland had already ordered the nascent Igloo White operation to assist in the Marine defense. The Marine garrison was also reinforced, and on November 1, 1967, Operation Scotland began. The PAVN forces were in the process of gaining elevated terrain before it launched the main attack. [44], On 14 August, Colonel David E. Lownds took over as commander of the 26th Marine Regiment. Taking a larger but more realistic view, the Khe Sanh campaign resulted in a death toll of American military personnel that approached 1,000. By comparison, according to another Army general, a 10:1 ratio was considered average and 25:1 was considered very good. 216217. Those 10 deaths were also left out of the official statistics. The launching of the largest enemy offensive thus far in the conflict did not shift Westmoreland's focus away from Khe Sanh. [59], During the rainy night of 2 January 1968, six men dressed in black uniforms were seen outside the defensive wire of the main base by members of a listening post. Click to View Online Archive The Battle of Khe Sanh was conducted northwestern Quaag Tri Province, South Vietnam, between January 21 and July 9, 1968 during the Vietnam War. On April 15, Operation Pegasus ended and Operation Scotland II began. [67], At the same time as the artillery bombardment at KSCB, an attack was launched against Khe Sanh village, seat of Hng Ha District. The badly-deteriorated Route 9 ran from the coastal region through the western highlands and crossed the border into Laos. On Easter Sunday, April 14, the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines (3/26), assaulted Hill 881 North in order to clear the enemy firing positions. [24], The plateau camp was permanently manned by the US Marines in 1967, when they established an outpost next to the airstrip. A 77 day battle, Khe Sanh had been the biggest single battle of the Vietnam War to that point. [78], Thus began what was described by John Morocco as "the most concentrated application of aerial firepower in the history of warfare". [94] Although the PAVN was known to possess two armored regiments, it had not yet fielded an armored unit in South Vietnam, and besides, the Americans considered it impossible for them to get one down to Khe Sanh without it being spotted by aerial reconnaissance. Amid heavy shelling, the Marines attempted to salvage what they could before destroying what remained as they were evacuated. Rod Andrew, Jr., a history professor at Clemson University and colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, has written an easily read and thoroughly . Background [ edit] [63] Hills 881 South, 861, and the main base itself would be simultaneously attacked that same evening. In 1966, the regular Special Forces troops had moved off the plateau and built a smaller camp down Route 9 at Lang Vei, about half the distance to the Laotian border. They attacked 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 64 district capitals, five of the six major cities, and more than two dozen airfields and bases. None of the deaths associated with Scotland II are included in the official count. The PAVN claimed that Khe Sanh was "a stinging defeat from both the military and political points of view." [74], During January, the recently installed electronic sensors of Operation Muscle Shoals (later renamed "Igloo White"), which were undergoing test and evaluation in southeastern Laos, were alerted by a flurry of PAVN activity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail opposite the northwestern corner of South Vietnam. Five Marines were killed on January 19 and 20, while on reconnaissance patrols. The attack on Khe Sanh, however, proved to be a diversionary tactic for the larger Tet Offensive. [96], The Marines at Khe Sanh had a plan in place for providing a ground relief force in just such a contingency, but Lownds, fearing a PAVN ambush, refused to implement it. Had the plane been shot down departing Khe Sanh, the casualties would have been counted. Battle of Khe Sanh (21 January - 9 April 1968) Max Hastings wrote a bestseller on Vietnam, and Dan met him to discuss Domino theory, whether it was possible for the US to win the war and the effect the war had on those who fought in it. Battle of Hamburger Hill The 29 th North Vietnam Army had entrenched themselves on Hamburger Hill in South Vietnam; a joint US-South Vietnamese force was ordered to remove them. Of the 500 CIDG troops at Lang Vei, 200 had been killed or were missing and 75 more were wounded. [152] The Marines occupied Hill 950 overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau from 1966 until September 1969 when control was handed to the Army who used the position as a SOG operations and support base until it was overrun by the PAVN in June 1971. [117], Cumulative friendly casualties for Operation Scotland, which began on 1 November 1967, were: 205 killed in action, 1,668 wounded, and 25 missing and presumed dead. The main US forces defending Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) were two regiments of the United States Marine Corps supported by elements from the United States Army and the United States Air Force (USAF), as well as a small number of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops. [20] These figures do not include casualties among Special Forces troops at Lang Vei, aircrews killed or missing in the area, or Marine replacements killed or wounded while entering or exiting the base aboard aircraft. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. By early January, the defenders could count on fire support from 46 artillery pieces of various calibers, five tanks armed with 90-mm guns, and 92 single or Ontos-mounted 106-mm recoilless rifles. Lima Company finally seized the hill after overcoming determined NVA resistance. Casualties were heavy among the attacking PAVN, who lost over 200 killed, while the defending Marines lost two men. To support the Marine base, a massive aerial bombardment campaign (Operation Niagara) was launched by the USAF. [170][140], One argument that was then leveled by Westmoreland and has since often quoted by historians of the battle is that only two Marine regiments were tied down at Khe Sanh, compared with the several PAVN divisions. This marked the first time that all three battalions of the 26th Marine Regiment had operated together in combat since the Battle of Iwo Jima during the Second World War. The NVA used Hill 881 North to launch 122mm rockets at the Marines during the siege. For seven weeks, American aircraft dropped from 35,000 to 40,000 tons of bombs in nearly 4,000 airstrikes. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. At 0330 hours, soldiers of the NVA 6th Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 325C Division, attacked the Marines on Hill 861. The American military presence at Khe Sanh consisted not only of the Marine Corps Khe Sanh Combat Base, but also Forward Operating Base 3, U.S. Army (FOB-3). [173][174], After the ARVN defeat in Laos, the newly-reopened KSCB came under attack by PAVN sappers and artillery and the base was abandoned once again on 6 April 1971.[175][176]. A historian, General Dave Palmer, accepted that rationale: "General Giap never had any intention of capturing Khe Sanh [it] was a feint, a diversionary effort. [138], On the following day, the 2nd Brigade captured the old French fort near Khe Sanh village after a three-day battle. [122], In late February, ground sensors detected the 66th Regiment, 304th Division preparing to mount an attack on the positions of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion on the eastern perimeter. [86] The command and control arrangement then in place in Southeast Asia went against Air Force doctrine, which was predicated on the single air manager concept. The advance would be supported by 102 pieces of artillery. As a result of this intelligence, KSCB was reinforced on 22 January 1968 by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment. Fighting around Khe Sanh was continuous. [88] Westmoreland was so obsessed with the tactical situation that he threatened to resign if his wishes were not obeyed. [107] The greatest impediments to the delivery of supplies to the base were the closure of Route 9 and the winter monsoon weather. "[91][92], Not much activity (with the exception of patrolling) had occurred thus far during the battle for the Special Forces Detachment A-101 and their four companies of Bru CIDGs stationed at Lang Vei. An additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II as of the end of June 1968. [31] Mortar rounds, artillery shells, and 122mm rockets fell randomly but incessantly upon the base. "[52], Brigadier General Lowell English (assistant commander 3rd Marine Division) complained that the defense of the isolated outpost was ludicrous: "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. [54] In attempting to determine PAVN intentions Marine intelligence confirmed that, within a period of just over a week, the 325th Division had moved into the vicinity of the base and two more divisions were within supporting distance. The Twenty-fifth United States Infantry Regiment was one of the racially segregated units of the United States Army known as Buffalo Soldiers.The 25th served from 1866 to 1957, seeing action in the American Indian Wars, Spanish-American War, Philippine-American War and World War II. Historian Ronald Spector, in the book After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam, noted that American casualties in the 10 weeks after the start of Operation Pegasus were more than twice those officially reported during the siege. That afternoon, as a rescue force was dispatched to the village, Army Lt. Col. Joseph Seymoe and other soldiers died when their helicopter was attacked. The adoption of this concept at the end of February was the turning point in the resupply effort. The low figure often cited for US casualties (205 killed in action, 443 wounded, 2 missing) does not take into account U.S. Army or Air Force casualties or those incurred during Operation Pegasus. The PAVN 130mm and 152mm artillery pieces, and 122mm rockets, had a longer range than the Marine artillery support which consisted of 105mm and 155mm howitzers. At 21:30, the attack came on, but it was stifled by the small arms of the Rangers, who were supported by thousands of artillery rounds and air strikes. NVA casualties were more than 200. [165], Another interpretation was that the North Vietnamese were planning to work both ends against the middle, a strategy that has come to be known as the Option Play. Even so, Westmoreland insisted for it not only to be occupied by the Marines but also for it to be reinforced. [35], American intelligence analysts were quite baffled by the series of enemy actions. Operation Scotland II continued until the end of the year, resulting in the deaths of 72 more Marines. The exact number of casualties suffered by both sides during the Khe Sanh battle is very difficult to ascertain, given that in many cases the two warring factions provided their own disparate counts. During aerial resupply:1 KC-130, 3 C-123 ARVN losses: 229 killed, 436 wounded (not including CIDG, RF/PF and SOG losses)CIDG losses: 1,000 1,500 killed or missing, at least 250 captured (in Lang Vei), wounded unknown[16] Kingdom of Laos: Unknown. [153][154] The gradual withdrawal of US forces began during 1969 and the adoption of Vietnamization meant that, by 1969, "although limited tactical offensives abounded, US military participation in the war would soon be relegated to a defensive stance. The aircrew then had to contend with antiaircraft fire on the way out. Cushman was appalled by the "implication of a rescue or breaking of the siege by outside forces. [140] Operation Scotland II would continue until 28 February 1969 resulting in 435 Marines and 3304 PAVN killed. American logistical, aerial, and artillery support was provided to the operation. At around 10:00, the fire ignited a large quantity of explosives, rocking the base with another series of detonations. [15], Unknown (1,602 bodies were counted, US official public estimated 10,00015,000 KIA,[19][20] but MACV's secret report estimated 5,550 killed as of 31 March 1968)[1]. [77] When weather conditions precluded FAC-directed strikes, the bombers were directed to their targets by either a Marine AN/TPQ-10 radar installation at KSCB or by Air Force Combat Skyspot MSQ-77 stations. The strike wounded two more Strike Force soldiers and damaged two bunkers. Following a rolling barrage fired by nine artillery batteries, the Marine attack advanced through two PAVN trenchlines, but the Marines failed to locate the remains of the men of the ambushed patrol. The Khe Sanh battlefield was considerably more extensive from the North Vietnamese perspective than from that of the U.S. Marine Corps, both geographically and chronologically. If firepower determined the outcome of the fight, it was airlift that allowed the defenders to hold their positions. Ten more Marines and 89 NVA died during this period. In the course of the fighting, Allied forces fired 151,000 artillery rounds, flew 2,096 tactical air sorties, and conducted 257 B-52 Stratofortress strikes. Army Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Ladd (commander, 5th Special Forces Group), who had just flown in from Khe Sanh, was reportedly, "astounded that the Marines, who prided themselves on leaving no man behind, were willing to write off all of the Green Berets and simply ignore the fall of Lang Vei. Its mission was to destroy the Special Forces and their Vietnamese allies and to ambush any reinforcements coming from Khe Sanh. [10] Once the news of the closure of KSCB was announced, the American media immediately raised questions about the reasoning behind its abandonment. Due to the nature of these activities, and the threat that they posed to KSCB, Westmoreland ordered Operation Niagara I, an intense intelligence collection effort on PAVN activities in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh Valley. [79] On an average day, 350 tactical fighter-bombers, 60 B-52s, and 30 light observation or reconnaissance aircraft operated in the skies near the base. This caused problems for the Marine command, which possessed its own aviation squadrons that operated under their own close air support doctrine. Two days later, US troops detected PAVN trenches running due north to within 25 m of the base perimeter. As early as 1962, the U.S. Military CommandVietnam (MACV) established an Army Special Forces camp near the village. The official figure of 205 KIA only represents Marine deaths in the Operation Scotland TAORthat is, Marines killed in proximity to the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the period from November 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968. He gave the order for US Marines to take up positions around Khe Sanh. The Marines, whose aircraft and doctrine were integral to their operations, were under no such centralized control. Dien Bien Phu would loom large for the rest of the war, especially during the Battle of Khe Sanh. The attack was to have been supported by armor and artillery. It reveals that the nuclear option was discounted because of terrain considerations that were unique to South Vietnam, which would have reduced the effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons. The platoon withdrew following a three-hour battle that left six Marines dead, 24 missing, and one taken prisoner. On 18 January, Westmoreland passed his request for Air Force control up the chain of command to CINCPAC in Honolulu. In fact, neither side won a resounding victory. By the end of May, Marine forces were again drawn down from two battalions to one, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. The official assessment of the North Vietnamese Army dead is just over 1,600 killed, with two . During the darkness of January 20-21, the NVA launched a series of coordinated attacks against American positions. The NVA 304th Divisions history notes that on 9 July 1968, the liberation flag was waving from the flag pole at Ta Con [Khe Sanh] airfield. On July 13, 1968, Ho Chi Minh sent a message to the soldiers of the Route 9Khe Sanh Front affirming our victory at Khe Sanh.. After failing to respond to a challenge, they were fired upon and five were killed outright while the sixth, although wounded, escaped. Soon after, another shell hit a cache of tear gas, which saturated the entire area. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. See also Pisor, p. 108. "[106] At the end of January, Tompkins had ordered that no Marine patrols proceed more than 500 meters from the Combat Base. The Battle of Khe Sanh began Jan. 21, 1968, with inconclusive ground activity by US and North Vietnamese patrols. [104] Ladd, back on the scene, reported that the Marines stated, "they couldn't trust any gooks in their damn camp. Time magazine, in an April 12, 1968, article titled Victory at Khe Sanh, reported General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, after flying into Khe Sanh by helicopter, declaring: We took 220 killed at Khe Sanh and about 800 wounded and evacuated. That appraisal was later altered when the PAVN was found to be moving major forces into the area. They were not included in the official Khe Sanh counts. HistoryNet.com is brought to you by HistoryNet LLC, the worlds largest publisher of history magazines. The PAVN claim that during the entire battle they "eliminated" 17,000 enemy troops, including 13,000 Americans and destroyed 480 aircraft. The origin of the combat base lay in the construction by US Army Special Forces of an airfield in August 1962 outside the village at an old French fort. [36], Things remained quiet in the Khe Sanh area through 1966. While climbing, the C-123 was struck by several bursts of heavy machine gun and recoilless rifle fire. The ground troops had been specially equipped for the attack with satchel charges, tear gas, and flame throwers. McNamara wrote: "because of terrain and other conditions peculiar to our operations in South Vietnam, it is inconceivable that the use of nuclear weapons would be recommended there against either Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces". "[159] In assessing North Vietnamese intentions, Peter Brush cites the claim of Vietnamese theater commander, V Nguyn Gip, "that Khe Sanh itself was not of importance, but only a diversion to draw U.S. forces away from the populated areas of South Vietnam. [131], Planning for the overland relief of Khe Sanh had begun as early as 25 January 1968, when Westmoreland ordered General John J. Tolson, commander, First Cavalry Division, to prepare a contingency plan. 129131. Operational control of the Khe Sanh area was handed over to the US Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division for the duration of Operation Pegasus. [111] The base could also depend on fire support from US Army 175-mm guns located at Camp Carroll, east of Khe Sanh. From the Hu site the communication signal was sent to Danang headquarters where it could be sent anywhere in the world. The attacks hindered the advancement of the McNamara Line, and as the fighting around Khe Sanh intensified, vital equipment including sensors and other hardware had to be diverted from elsewhere to meet the needs of the US garrison at Khe Sanh. The 1968 Battle of Khe Sanh was the longest, deadliest and most controversial of the Vietnam War, pitting the U.S. Marines and their allies against the North Vietnamese Army. 239240. While suffering less significant casualties (around 10,000 dead), ARVN units had only turned back the attacking PAVN forces with massive American air support. Both sides suffered major casualties with both claiming victory of their own. [59], Making matters worse for the defenders, any aircraft that braved the weather and attempted to land was subject to PAVN antiaircraft fire on its way in for a landing. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. By the middle of January 1968, some 6,000 Marines and Army troops occupied the Khe Sanh Combat Base and its surrounding positions. [116] Marine analysis of PAVN artillery fire estimated that the PAVN gunners had fired 10,908 artillery and mortar rounds and rockets into Marine positions during the battle. [148], Regardless, the PAVN had gained control of a strategically important area, and its lines of communication extended further into South Vietnam. [53] Two divisions, the 304th and the 325th, were assigned to the operation: the 325th was given responsibility for the area around the north, while the 304th was given responsibility for the southern sector. After a ten-day battle, the attackers were pushed back into Cambodia. Military History Institute of Vietnam, pp. For a succinct overview of the creation of the CIDG program and its operations. Its main objectives were to inflict casualties on US troops and to isolate them in the remote border regions. The Pegasus force consisted of the Army 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) plus the 1st Marine Regiment. It was a bad beginning to a long 77-day siege. Listen Now. [23][Note 2], James Marino wrote that in 1964, General William Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, had determined, "Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base blocking enemy infiltration from Laos; a base for operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance to survey the Ho Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for the defenses south of the DMZ; and an eventual jumping-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The tower at Khe Sanh instructed the pilot to take evasive action and go around for another approach. MACV therefore initiated an operation to open Route 9 to vehicle traffic. The next operations were named Crockett and Ardmore. The border battles, however, had two significant consequences, which were unappreciated at the time. Gordan L Rottman, Osprey Campaign 150: The Khe Sanh 1967-68, p. 51. [110], As more infantry units had been assigned to defend KSCB, artillery reinforcement kept pace. This article was written by Peter Brush and originally published in the June 2007 issue of Vietnam Magazine. [140] Total US casualties during the operation were 92 killed, 667 wounded, and five missing. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. In response, US forces were built up before the PAVN isolated the Marine base. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, pp. "[73], Nevertheless, ultimately the nuclear option was discounted by military planners. This base was to serve as the western anchor of Marine Corps forces, which had tactical responsibility for the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam known as I Corps. This range overmatch was used by the PAVN to avoid counter-battery fire. Consequently, and unknown at the time, Operation Scotland became the starting point of the Battle of Khe Sanh in terms of Marine casualty reporting. Since the Marines on board were not yet officially attached to the 26th Marine Regiment, their deaths were not included in the official Khe Sanh count, nor were the several other deaths associated with aircraft crashes. Overnight, they were moved to a temporary position a short distance from the perimeter and from there, some of the Laotians were eventually evacuated, although the majority turned around and walked back down Route 9 toward Laos. Once the aircraft touched down, it became the target of any number of PAVN artillery or mortar crews. On the first day of battle, a big Communist rocket scored a direct hit on the main Marine ammunition dump, destroying 1,500 tons of high explosives, 98 percent of available ammunition. [1] According to Brush, it was "the only occasion in which Americans abandoned a major combat base due to enemy pressure" and in the aftermath, the North Vietnamese began a strong propaganda campaign, seeking to exploit the US withdrawal and to promote the message that the withdrawal had not been by choice. [40] The 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 3rd Marine Regiment, under the command of Colonel John P. Lanigan, reinforced KSCB and were given the task of pushing the PAVN off of Hills 861, 881 North, and 881 South.
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